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The Begum Judgment on the Couch  
The Supreme Court’s judgment in the Begum casei has attracted already, even in the 
few days since its release, multiple readings and commentary. This comment will attempt a 
different kind of reading, and of listening, given the judgment was not only published but also 
broadcast live as delivered by Lord Reed. It will employ Freud’s method of listening to his 
patients with evenly suspended attention.ii This hovering attention is designed to bypass what 
Lacan later called ‘empty speech,’ the parts of the patient’s discourse that bear no relation to, 
and indeed are designed to conceal her desire, in order to uncover her ‘full speech,’ the parts 
of her discourse that unwittingly or not, betray a glimpse into the patient’s truth.  
While this method can be recommended in all cases, it is particularly apt in this case 
which, like Freud’s famous retelling of his own dream of Irma’s injection, tries to reach into 
the navel of the dream, but never quite reaches it. The navel around which this case circulates 
and never quite touches, let alone addresses, is the decision that sparked the spade of appeals 
and cross appeals in the first place, the then Home Secretary’s Sajid Javid’s deprivation of 
Samina Begum’s British citizenship. That decision is at the core of the case yet none of the 
courts before whom the parties have been to date, the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC), the Court of Appeal, the Divisional Court, nor, now, the Supreme Court, 
have yet examined. 
The Home Secretary’s decision in February 2019 to strip Shamina Begum of  
citizenship is therefore the absent centre of these lengthy proceedings. Last month’s 47 page 
judgment did not address that decision and, as the Supreme Court admitted, that decision is not 
likely to be addressed in the foreseeable future. Instead the judgment addressed successive 
appeals and cross-appeals to that decision and to the Home Secretary’s refusal of Ms Begum’s 
application for leave to enter to appeal the decision. The appeals, invoking statutory rights of 
appeal, applications for judicial review and human rights claims, were first heard by SIAC 
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which turned them down, then by the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court which allowed 
them in part, remitted other parts to SIAC for redetermination, and ordered the Home Secretary 
to grant Ms Begum leave to enter, before arriving at the Supreme Court. To compound the 
complexity, in relation to judicial review claims, SIAC sat as an Administrative Court, while 
in relation to the deprivation and refusal of leave to enter decisions, it sat as an immigration 
tribunal. The same pattern continued on appeal: a panel of three judges sat as a Divisional Court 
in relation to judicial review, while in relation to leave to enter, it sat as a Court of Appeal; 
even though the issues were heard concurrently and with the same judges sitting under different 
hats.  
It is important to give a flavour of the procedural structures framing, and dominating, 
these proceedings and which served to avoid addressing the substantive issues that were never 
ultimately heard and, as things stand at moment, will not be heard any time soon. The grounds 
for appeal were varied: the appeal against deprivation of citizenship rested on sections of the 
1981 British Nationality Act, sections of the 1997 Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
Act, articles of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), sections of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and sections of the 1998 Human Rights Act. These 
provisions had been updated by subsequent legislation with the result that the scope for appeals 
had already been heavily restricted by Parliament. As the Supreme Court summarised 
commenting on the 2002 Act, ‘Each of those provisions was either repealed or substantially 
amended by the 2014 Immigration Act, with the effect of restricting the scope of appeals and 
narrowing the powers of the Tribunal and SIAC.’iii 
So far so complicated but that is not even half the story. Ms Begum’s parallel 
application for leave to enter rested on a set of different provisions altogether: first on sections 
of the 1971 Immigration Act, while her appeal against refusal of leave to enter rested on 
applications for judicial review to SIAC sitting as an Administrative Court and then to the 
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Court of Appeal sitting as a Divisional Court; the latter necessitated a cross-reference to the 
Home Office’s Memorandum to the 1997 and 2014 Acts laying out Home Office practice in 
such cases; that practice was of not depriving subjects of their citizenship if there was a risk of 
their rights under ECHR being violated.iv  
As if these provisions and their multiple amendments weren’t labyrinthine enough, the 
Supreme Court emphasised that the principles different appellate bodies had to employ varied 
depending on the body hearing the appeals, the body making the decisions, as well as the type 
of decision being made: ‘Different principles may even apply to the same decision,’ SC 
warned, ‘where it has a number of aspects giving rise to different considerations, or where 
different statutory provisions are applicable.’v  
Far from attempting to consolidate, clarify or simplify the plethora of intersecting 
grounds, the Supreme Court did what every patient wanting to avoid confronting their own role 
in the process would do; first they looked for guidance from caselaw, then, on finding that 
caselaw answered sometimes Yes and other times No to the question, it decided instead to add 
to the proliferating mix their own elucidations and novel distinctions. 
We can pick up one of these threads to examine in detail for illustration: a pivotal 
element in the Court of Appeal’s decision to allow Ms Begum’s appeal was its interpretation 
of the scope of SIAC’s appeal powers; the Court of Appeal reasoned that SIAC had 
misinterpreted its remit by limiting itself to reviewing the Secretary of State’s decision on 
administrative law grounds; instead, the Court of Appeal held, SIAC’s task was to put itself in 
the Secretary of State’s shoes and make the decision anew. For that reason it remitted the case 
to SIAC for redetermination.  
When the Home Secretary appealed, the Supreme Court acknowledged there was no 
explicit statutory provision on the scope of SIAC’s appeal remit.vi When statute is silent courts 
look to precedent for assistance but in this case the Supreme Court admitted precedent was also 
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divided.vii Since both statute and precedent are not conclusive, perhaps the literal meaning of 
words might help? The Special Immigration Appeals Commission, after all, is called an 
appeals, not a review Commission. The Supreme Court also acknowledged that ‘Section 2B of 
the 1997 Act confers a right of appeal, in distinction to sections 2C to 2E, which provide for 
“review.”’viii It acknowledged too that as regards the human rights claim, SIAC is not only 
called to review but can decide for itself.ix How did this line of reasoning then lead to the 
opposite conclusion? The Supreme Court introduced a fresh distinction between reviewing 
statutory duties as opposed to reviewing administrative policies and decided that while courts 
can review statutory duties, their role in the exercise of administrative policies was restricted 
to examining whether the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds to reach the decision. 
Deprivation of citizenship decisions were in pursuit of administrative policies and therefore 
couldn’t be impugned.x 
Prompting the reader to ask, when is an appeal not an appeal, and when is a decision 
not a decision; as the Court also indicated, following the 2004 Immigration Act, ‘deprivation 
decisions’ are no longer ‘immigration decisions.’xi The mental acrobatics required to avoid 
giving SIAC appellate powers didn’t go unnoticed by the Court itself which at one stage felt 
compelled to negate its own reasoning: ‘That is not to say that SIAC’s jurisdiction is 
supervisory rather than appellate. Its jurisdiction is appellate, and references to a supervisory 
jurisdiction in this context are capable of being a source of confusion.’xii It seems, nevertheless, 
that not all appeals are equal, some appeals are more equal than others and rather than 
dissipating the confusion, the Supreme Court’s own distinctions compounded it. 
Psychoanalysis is very familiar with the patient who spends her expensive sessions 
circling around an issue, chatting to the analyst about this and that avoiding, and indeed in 
order to avoid, getting to the crux of the matter. Why would a patient waste her time and money 
to avoid saying what really matters. It is tempting to think the patient may be protecting herself, 
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she has something to hide, something she is ashamed of, or feels guilty about. Often, however, 
it’s not herself, or not only herself, the patient is protecting but the Big Other she wants to hide 
behind: let’s keep talking, keep looking busy, keep occupying ourselves with peripheral issues 
so that our own, and the Big Other’s lack, don’t show through. Paradoxically the Other the 
Supreme Court is protecting behind a wall of procedural niceties and subtleties is also the Other 
the Supreme Court conferred ultimate discretion to make decisions on national security and 
whose decisions, it concluded, can rarely be impugned.  
The Supreme Court categorically, and in contrast to the Court of Appeal, declared that 
‘The role of the court is supervisory, not primary decision-maker.’xiii The Court of Appeal had 
acknowledged the national security implications of allowing leave to enter but determined that 
fairness and natural justice outweighed that risk.xiv The Supreme Court had curt rebukes at this 
point:  
The Court of Appeal’s approach did not give the Secretary of State’s assessment the 
respect which it should have received, given that it is the Secretary of State who has 
been charged by Parliament with responsibility for making such assessments, and who 
is democratically accountable to Parliament for the discharge of that responsibility.xv 
The Supreme Court’s self-restraint is not new as it was at pains to point out, citing Lord 
Hoffman on the separation of powers between executive and judiciary.xvi The irony is that it 
took just a handful of paragraphs to dismiss the Court of Appeal’s reasoning when the bulk of 
the judgment, round 100 out of 137 paragraphs (that’s nearly 40 minutes out of a 50 minute 
session) are spent examining and distinguishing varying grounds of appeal and previous 
caselaw before pronouncing, finally, its own view on the matter. As it turned out, that view 
was rather limited and can be summed up under the broad conclusion, ‘This is a difficult 
situation, there is no right answer, so I’m afraid there’s nothing we can do.’ In the Supreme 
Court’s own words, ‘The constituent elements of what is a fair process are not absolute or fixed 
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but do not provide an answer what to do if a fair procedure is impossible.’xvii Given the same 
separation of powers celebrated by invoking Lord Hoffman allocates the administration of 
justice to the judiciary, it seems an abdication of the Supreme Court’s role to commend the 
separation of powers and then, as judiciary, resolve to do, nothing.  Nothing is indeed what the 
outcome is for the foreseeable future, as the appeals against the deprivation decision and refusal 
of leave to enter, remain in indefinite limbo.  
It's worth recalling that this state of limbo is exactly what the Court of Appeal deemed 
unacceptable: ‘simply to stay her appeal indefinitely’ Lord Justice Flaux said, ‘is wrong in 
principle. It would in effect render her appeal against an executive decision to deprive her of 
her British nationality meaningless for an unlimited period of time.’xviii The Supreme Court 
recognised the impasse and tried to wish it away: ‘The fact that the appeal process is a safeguard 
against unfairness does not mean that a decision which cannot be the subject of an effective 
appeal is unfair.’xix Unfortunately tautologous reasoning achieves precisely what it sets out to 
avoid: it underlines, rather than conceals, what it tried to evade. In this case it reminds the 
reader of SIAC’s unequivocal finding that an appeal in which the appellant could not 
participate would not be a fair hearing.xx  
Freud’s recommendation to analysts to maintain an ‘evenly suspended attention’ to 
everything they hear was designed to avoid an important danger: that of focusing on parts of 
the patient’s discourse and run the risk of making one’s own selection from the material: if the 
analyst makes her own selection from the plethora of the patient’s associations, the analyst ‘is 
in danger of never finding anything but what he already knows.’xxi If we pay even attention to 
all 137 paragraphs of SC’s judgment, what sticks out, perhaps like a bone in the throat, in this 
sea of microscopic examination and dissection of procedures, statutes and caselaw? Is there a 
sudden change of tone that indicates something significant, if unacknowledged, is intervening? 
The reader here bears as much responsibility as the writer in identifying aberrant asides, and I 
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will mention just three that stuck out for me. First, the rather gratuitous ticking off of a first 
instance judge on whose judgment the Court of Appeal had relied and with whom the Supreme 
Court disagreed; there’s an aside almost suggesting, we know his type, he has form, he’s the 
type who doesn’t listen to the House of Lords.xxii Another factor, Ms Begum’s leaving Britain 
of her own accord didn’t fail not to get mentioned in earlier appeals, despite counsel’s protest 
that her voluntary departure bore no relevance to whether her appeal would be fair or not. As 
the Court of Appeal commented,  
‘the key justification for going ahead with the deprivation decision was that she had 
been out of the UK for some years of her own choice. He noted that this was part of the 
reasoning of SIAC and the Secretary of State mentioned the point in one form or another 
in seven places in her skeleton argument.’xxiii  
Finally, a stark line from a previous case manages to appear several times in the judgment, 
despite its tone of alarming finality in what is supposed to be an investigation into whether an 
appellant should appear in person: ‘no amount of conditions, or careful watching of a person 
who is in the United Kingdom, can achieve the assurance of knowing that they are outside the 
United Kingdom permanently.’xxiv  
The Supreme Court declaring SIAC’s appeal powers narrower than deemed by the 
Court of Appeal means executive decisions can only be challenged under administrative law 
grounds, that is, if the Home Secretary acted in a way no reasonable Home Secretary would 
have acted. The limited grounds on which Courts can review such decisions don’t quite make 
Home Secretaries into Freud’s father of the primal horde but in this case, the result is not far 
off: Home Secretaries are bound by (some) rules, but we won’t know whether they followed 
them because there is no prospect of effectively appealing their decision. The Supreme Court 
abdicating its responsibility of finding a way out of the impasse means the decision remains 
unappealable even when Parliament, following rebuke from Strasbourg, specifically provided 
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for an appeal: SC reminds us SIAC was created precisely in response to criticism that there 
must be a mechanism for appeals from decisions of the Home Secretary.xxv  That reminder 
however doesn’t prompt a different conclusion: ‘Parliament has conferred a right of appeal, 
Parliament hasn’t stipulated what to do when the right of appeal cannot be effectively 
exercised.’xxvi This abdication of responsibility is particularly spectacular given the highest 
Court charged with the administration of justice asks itself what it should do and concludes 
that the thing to do is to do nothing; even when the Court admits that the likely consequence is 
not that the disadvantaged party wins, but that the disadvantaged party loses.xxvii  
As disconcerting as the Supreme Court’s evasion of the issues it did address, are the 
implications of issues it did not address; conspicuously unargued before the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeal, was SIAC’s finding that the decision to deprive Ms Begum of British 
nationality did not render her stateless. This finding was not challenged by Ms Begum’s team, 
despite the ripple effects it could have on subsequent decisions: in particular although it was 
claimed that British citizenship (or lack of) was not likely to make any difference to an 
individual’s treatment in Syria, there was arguably a risk of treatment contrary to ECHR should 
they be moved to Bangladesh or Iraq. That risk was deemed to be remote and therefore 
deprivation of citizenship was not deemed contrary to Home Office practice. The unspoken 
implication, however, is that the nationality of British citizens whose parents were born abroad 
is somehow different from, or conditional, to that of other British nationals, confirming, that 
is, that the children of immigrants do indeed need to (continue to) be good immigrants.  
A good analyst of course would never share these thoughts with their patient, at least 
not openly. A cough, a silence, a repetition of the patient’s words might be used to encourage 
the patient to see, and to hear for themselves, the significance of what they just said. I mention 
a few lines an analyst might repeat to the Supreme Court in this case, perhaps raising her tone 
at some words, to enable it listen back to itself. First,  
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‘The fact that the appeal process is a safeguard against unfairness does not mean that 
a decision which cannot be the subject of an effective appeal is unfair.’xxviii 
Then, 
consider how such a body should reasonably respond to a problem of that kind, having 
regard to its responsibility for the administration of justice.xxix  
And lastly:  
the risk of transfer to Iraq or Bangladesh, and possible mistreatment there, was in any 
event irrelevantxxx 
Once the analyst has repeated these lines back, she would sit quietly, wait for the analysand to 
take in what they just said, and whether they may be prompted to do something about it. This 
technique, Freud suggests, is particularly essential ‘with patients who practise the art of 
sheering off into intellectual discussion during their treatment, who speculate a great deal and 
often very wisely about their condition and in that way avoid doing anything to overcome it.’xxxi 
 
 
iR (on the application of Begum) (Appellant) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Respondent) 
R (on the application of Begum) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) 
Begum (Respondent) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2020-0156-judgment.pdf last accessed 10 March 2021. 
ii ‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psychoanalysis’ The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of 
Sigmund Freud Vol. XII (1911-1913) ed. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), 111. 
iii ibid at [36]. 
iv ibid at [21], [122]. 
v ibid at [69]. 
vi ibid at [40]: ‘There does not appear ever to have been any statutory provision relating to the grounds on which 
an appeal under section 2B may be brought, the matters to be considered, or how the appeal is to be determined.’ 
viiibid at [46]: ‘It is apparent from them that the principles to be applied by an appellate body, and the powers 
available to it, are by no means uniform. At one extreme, some authorities, concerned with licensing appeals to 
courts of summary jurisdiction, have held that such appeals should proceed as re-hearings, reflecting the terms of 
the relevant legislation and the procedures followed by such courts. Other authorities, concerned with appeals to 
the Court of Appeal against discretionary decisions by lower courts, have held that the scope of the appellate 
jurisdiction was much more limited. Modern authorities concerned with the scope of the jurisdiction of tribunals 
hearing appeals against discretionary decisions by administrative decision-makers have adopted varying 
approaches, reflecting the nature of the decision appealed against and the relevant statutory provisions.’ 
viii ibid at [65]. 
ix ibid at [37]: ‘It has been clear since the decision in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 
2 AC 167 that SIAC’s task, in considering an appeal on that ground, is not a secondary, reviewing, function 
                                                      
 10 
                                                                                                                                                                        
dependent on establishing that the Secretary of State misdirected himself or acted irrationally, but that SIAC must 
decide for itself whether the impugned decision is lawful.’ 
x ibid at [120-121]. 
xi ibid at [38]. 
xii ibid at [69]: ‘the characterisation of a jurisdiction as appellate does not determine the principles of law which 
the appellate body is to apply. As has been explained, they depend upon the nature of the decision under appeal 
and the relevant statutory provisions. Different principles may even apply to the same decision, where it has a 
number of aspects giving rise to different considerations, or where different statutory provisions are applicable.’ 
xiii ibid at [126]. 
xiv Shamima Begum v Special Immigration Appeals Commission and Secretary of State for the Home Department 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/WP-Begum-Judgment-NCN.pdf last accessed 7 March 
2021, para 121: ‘Notwithstanding the national security concerns about Ms Begum, I have reached the firm 
conclusion that given that the only way in which she can have a fair and effective appeal is to be permitted to 
come into the United Kingdom to pursue her appeal, fairness and justice must, on the facts of this case, outweigh 
the national security concerns, so that the LTE appeals should be allowed.’ 
xv Above n 1 at [134]. 
xvi Secretary of State For The Home Department v Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, Lord Hoffman, para 50, ‘It is a 
matter of judgment and policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions 
as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter for judicial decision. They 
are entrusted to the executive.’ quoted at para 56 and at para 62: ‘If the people are to accept the consequences of 
such decisions, they must be made by persons whom the people have elected and whom they can remove.’ Quoted 
above n 1 at [62]. 
xvii ibid [95]. 
xviii Above n 16 at [117]. 
xix Above n 1 at [88]. 
xx It was this finding that the Court of Appeal had relied on when it concluded that leave to enter had to be granted. 
Note the fact that no effective appeal could take place did not entitle Ms Begum to win her appeal, the deprivation 
decision continued to stand, but it did entitle her to the right to enter so that her appeal could be heard.  
xxi Above n 2 at [112]. 
xxii Ibid at [76] ‘Mitting J stated that “[w]e do not accept this limitation upon our decision-making power”. Mitting 
J’s reluctance to accept guidance from the House of Lords is also evident in another of his judgments which was 
cited by counsel for Ms Begum. In Zatuliveter v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appeal No 
SC/103/2010) (unreported) given 29 November 2011, para 8, he declined to follow the guidance given in Rehman 
as to the weight to be attached to the Secretary of State’s assessment, on the basis that “we believe that we are 
able to, and do, give more careful and detailed scrutiny to the risk posed by an individual appellant to national 
security than the Secretary of State”.’  
xxiii Above n 16 at [58]. 
xxiv ibid at [80]; above n 1 at [109]. 
xxv Above n 1 at [31]. In Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 the European Court of Human Rights 
found that Britain did not abide by its human rights obligations in not allowing appeals from decisions of the 
Home Secretary where those decisions were made on the grounds of national security.  
xxvi Above n 1 at [89]. 
xxvii ibid at [90]. 
xxviii Above n 1 at [88]. 
xxix Ibid [89] 
xxx Ibid [104] 
xxxi Above n 2, 119. 
